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NOTE: this is a revised version of a paper presented at
ISIPTA 2009. This is not a major revision; the purpose
was to correct some problems with the original paper.
The main point is that Example 1 has been changed (the
original example was flawed). Also, the definition of Bi
and some inequalities in the proof of limits in Theorem
4 have been corrected.
Abstract
This paper presents concentration inequalities and laws of
large numbers under weak assumptions of irrelevance, ex-
pressed through lower and upper expectations. The results
are variants and extensions of De Cooman and Miranda’s
recent inequalities and laws of large numbers. The proofs
indicate connections between concepts of irrelevance for
lower/upper expectations and the standard theory of mar-
tingales.
1 Introduction
This paper investigates concentration inequalities and laws
of large numbers under weak assumptions of “irrelevance”
that are expressed using lower and upper expectations. The
starting point is the assumption that, given bounded vari-
ables X1, . . . , Xn, we have:
for each i ∈ [2, n], variables X1, . . . , Xi−1
are epistemically irrelevant to Xi.
(1)
Epistemic irrelevance of variables X1, . . . , Xi−1 to Xi ob-
tains when [26, Def. 9.2.1]
E[f(Xi)|A(X1:i−1)] = E[f(Xi)] (2)
for any bounded function f of Xi and any nonempty event
A(X1:i−1) defined by variables X1:i−1, where the func-
tional E is an upper expectation (Section 2). Here and in
the remainder of the paper we simplify notation by using
X1:i for X1, . . . , Xi.
A judgement of epistemic irrelevance can be inter-
preted as a relaxed judgement of stochastic independence,
perhaps motivated by a robustness analysis or by disagree-
ments amongst a set of decision makers. Alternatively,
one might consider epistemic irrelevance as the appropriate
concept of independence when expectations are not known
precisely.
De Cooman and Miranda have recently proven a num-
ber of inequalities and laws of large numbers that also
deal with judgements of irrelevance expressed through
lower/upper expectations [5]. De Cooman and Miranda’s
weak law of large numbers implies that, given Assumption
(1), for any ǫ > 0,
P
(
µ
n
− ǫ ≤
∑n
i=1Xi
n
≤ µn + ǫ
)
≥ 1− 2e
−
nǫ2/4
(maxi Bi)
2 ,
where Bi is such that supXi − inf Xi ≤ Bi, and
µ
n
.
=
∑n
i=1E[Xi]
n
, µn
.
=
∑n
i=1 E[Xi]
n
.
Moreover, De Cooman and Miranda’s results and Assump-
tion (1) imply a two-part strong law of large numbers: for
any ǫ > 0, there is N ∈ N+ such that for any N ′ ∈ N+,
P
(
∃n ∈ [N,N +N ′] :
∑n
i=1Xi
n
≥ µ+ ǫ
)
< ǫ,
P
(
∃n ∈ [N,N +N ′] :
∑n
i=1Xi
n
≤ µ− ǫ
)
< ǫ.
This law of large numbers corresponds to a finitary version
of the usual strong law of large numbers [9]; the focus on
a finitary law is justified by the fact that De Cooman and
Miranda do not assume countable additivity. If countable
additivity holds, the finitary strong law of large numbers
implies convergence of empirical means with probability
one [5, Sec. 5.3].
To obtain their results, De Cooman and Miranda as-
sume, following Walley’s theory of lower previsions, that
all variables are bounded, and that conglomerability (and
consequently disintegrability) holds. These assumptions
are discussed in more detail later.
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The present paper derives laws of large numbers by ex-
ploiting concentration and martingale inequalities that are
adapted to the setting of lower/upper expectations. These
results use either Assumption (1) or the weaker assump-
tion that, for each i ∈ [2, n] and any nonempty event
A(X1:i−1),
E[Xi|A(X1:i−1)] = E[Xi]
and
E[Xi|A(X1:i−1)] = E[Xi].
(3)
Several results for bounded variables presented in this pa-
per are basically implied by De Cooman and Miranda’s
work. Regarding bounded variables our contribution lies
in offering tighter inequalities and alternative proof tech-
niques that are more closely related to established methods
in standard probability theory (in particular, close to Ho-
effding’s and Azuma’s inequalities). In Section 4 we of-
fer more significant contributions as we lift the assumption
of boundedness for variables, and use martingale theory to
prove laws of large numbers under elementwise disintegra-
bility.
2 Expectations, disintegrability, and
zero probabilities
In this section we present notation and terminology.
Throughout the paper we assume that an expectation func-
tional E maps bounded variables into real numbers, and
satisfies:
(1) if α ≤ X ≤ β, then α ≤ E[X ] ≤ β;
(2) E[X + Y ] = E[X ] + E[Y ];
where X,Y are bounded variables and α, β are real num-
bers (inequalities are understood pointwise).
From such an expectation functional, a finitely additive
probability measure P is induced by P (A) .= E[A] for any
eventA; note thatA denotes both the event and its indicator
function.1
Given a set of expectation functionals, the lower and
upper expectations of variable X are respectively
E[X ] = inf E[X ] , E[X ] = supE[X ] .
Lower and upper probabilities are defined similarly using
indicator functions. Given an event A, a conditional ex-
pectation functional is constrained by E[X |A]P (A) =
E[XA]. If we have a set of expectation functionals, then a
set of conditional expectation functionals given an event A
is produced by elementwise conditioning on event A (that
is, each expectation functional is conditioned on A).
1A probability measure defined on a field completely characterizes an
expectation functional on bounded functions that are measurable with re-
spect to the field and vice-versa [26, Theorem 3.2.2].
2.1 Disintegrability and factorization
We will employ an assumption of disintegrability in our
proofs; namely,
E[W ] ≤ E
[
E[W |Z]
] (4)
for any W ≥ 0, Z ≥ 0 of interest, where W and Z may
stand for sets of (non-negative) variables. Note that disin-
tegrability can fail for a single finitely additive probability
measure over an infinite space [6, 10]; that is, there is a
finitely additive probability measure P such that
EP [W ] > EP [EP [W |Z]] .
One way to obtain disintegrability is to restrict attention
to simple variables; that is, variables that take on finitely
many distinct values. In particular, indicator functions are
simple variables; hence simple variables suffice to express
convergence of relative frequencies, and our results apply
then.
Another way to obtain disintegrability for every proba-
bility measure P is to adopt countable additivity [1]. That
is, assume that if
A1 ⊃ A2 ⊃ . . .
is a countable sequence of events, then
∩i Ai = ∅ implies lim
n→∞
P (An) = 0. (5)
This assumption says that if ∩iAi = ∅, then
limn→∞ P (An) = 0 for every possible probability mea-
sure.
A third way to obtain disintegrability is simply to im-
pose it. One may consider disintegrability a “rationality”
requirement.
• The theories of coherent behavior by Heath and Sud-
derty [14] and by Lane and Sudderth [19] follow this
path by axiomatizing the strategic measures of Du-
bins and Savage [11], and thus prescribing proba-
bility measures that disintegrate appropriately along
some predefined partitions. This would be sufficient
for our purposes, but there are limitations in the ap-
proach as summarized by Kadane et al [16]. The dis-
integrability of strategic measures has actually been
used to prove various laws of large numbers in a
finitely additive setting [17].
• Another scheme that imposes disintegrability is Wal-
ley’s theory of lower previsions; in that theory, Ex-
pression (4) is a consequence of axioms for “co-
herent” behavior. This is the path adopted by De
Cooman and Miranda, who consequently have Ex-
pression (4) at their disposal.
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When disintegrability holds, recursive application of
Expression (4) yields: if fi(Xi) ≥ 0 for i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
then
E
[
n∏
i=1
fi(Xi)
]
≤ E
[
. . . E
[
E
[
n∏
i=1
fi(Xi)|X1:n−1
]
|X1:n−2
]
. . .
]
;
Assumption (1) then implies an inequality we use later: for
bounded and nonnegative functions,
E
[
n∏
i=1
fi(Xi)
]
≤
n∏
i=1
E[fi(Xi)] . (6)
2.2 Zero probabilities, full conditional mea-
sures and weak irrelevance
It should be noted that the definition of epistemic irrele-
vance (Expression (2)) does not contain any clause con-
cerning zero probabilities. Indeed, Walley’s theory of lower
previsions follows de Finetti in adopting full conditional
measures, and in this setting Expression (2) can be imposed
without concerns about zero probabilities. Recall that a full
conditional measure P : B × (B\∅) → ℜ, where B is a
Boolean algebra, is a set-function that for every nonempty
event C satisfies [10, 18]:
(1) P (C|C) = 1;
(2) P (A|C) ≥ 0 for all A;
(3) P (A ∪B|C) = P (A|C) + P (B|C) for all disjoint A
and B;
(4) P (A ∩B|C) = P (A|B ∩ C)P (B|C) for all A and B
such that B ∩ C 6= ∅.
Full conditional measures are not adopted in the
usual Kolmogorovian theory, and if countable additivity
is adopted and conditioning is defined through Radon-
Nykodym derivatives, it may be impossible to satisfy the
axioms for full conditional measures [23, 24]. Thus there
are are some differences between epistemic irrelevance (at
least as defined by Walley) and the usual Kolmogorovian
set-up, besides the obvious set-valued/point-valued distinc-
tion.
Suppose that one wishes to deal with sets of probabil-
ity measures and associated lower/upper expectations, but
chooses to adopt the Kolmogorovian set-up for each mea-
sure. That is, each measure satisfies countable additivity
and thus disintegrability, and conditioning is left undefined
when the conditioning event has probability zero. It might
seem reasonable to amend Expression (2) as follows:
E[f(Xi)|A(X1:i−1)] = E[f(Xi)] (7)
if P (A(X1:i−1)) > 0.
This condition is a natural for theories that do not define
conditioning on events of lower probability zero, such as
Giron and Rios’ theory [13]. Alas, this weaker condition
is really too weak to produce laws of large numbers, as the
following example shows.
Example 1 Consider binary variablesX1, X2, . . . (values
0 and 1). Define events A0 .= {X1 = 0, X2 = 0, . . . } and
A1
.
= {X1 = 1, X2 = 1, . . . }. Consider a convex and
closed set K of joint distributions for these variables, built
as the convex hull of three distributions, P1, P2 and P3, as
follows.
Distribution P1 simply assigns probability one to A1.
Distribution P2 assigns probability δ to A0 and probabil-
ity 1 − δ to A1, for some δ ∈ (0, 1). Distribution P3 is
the product of identical marginals: for any integer n > 0,
P3(X1 = x1, . . . , Xn = xn) =
∏n
i=1 P3(Xi = xi), where
P3(Xi = 1) = 1− δ.
For the convex hull of P1, P2 and P3, Expression
(7) is satisfied. This conclusion is reached by analyz-
ing each distribution in turn. For distribution P1, we
have P1(X1 = 1) = 1 and for any i > 1 we have
P1(Xi = 1|A(X1:i−1)) = 1 whenever P (A(X1:i−1)) >
0. Note that for any event A(X1:i−1): if A1 ∈ A, then
P1(A) = 1; if A1 6⊆ A, then P1(A) = 0. For distribution
P2, P2(Xi = 1) = 1 − δ for any i > 0. Additionally,
for any event A(X1:i−1) we have P2(Xi = 1|A) either
equal to 1 − δ or 1 whenever P (A) > 0. [If A1 6⊆ A,
then P (A) = 0 (due to P1). So suppose A1 ⊆ A: If
A0 ⊆ A, then P2(Xi = 1|A) = 1 − δ; if A0 6⊆ A,
then P2(Xi = 1|A) = 1.] For distribution P3, we have
P3(Xi = 1) = 1 − δ and for any i > 1 we have
P3(Xi = 1|A) = 1−δ for any nonempty eventA(X1:i−1).
In short, for all probability measures in the credal set we
have P (Xi = 1) ∈ [1− δ, 1] and P (Xi = 1|A(X1:i−1)) ∈
[1− δ, 1] whenever P (A(X1:i−1)) > 0..
The weak law of larger numbers fails because, for any
ǫ ∈ (0, 1− δ),
lim
n→∞
P
(
µ
n
− ǫ ≤
∑n
i=1Xi
n
≤ µn + ǫ
)
= 1− δ.
This follows from the fact that, for any integer
n > 0, we have P1 (
∑n
i=1Xi/n = 1) = 1 and
P2 (
∑n
i=1Xi/n = 1) = 1 − P2(A0) = 1 − δ, and for
any ǫ > 0 (due to standard weak law of large numbers),
lim
n→∞
P3
(
(1− δ)− ǫ <
n∑
i=1
Xi/n < (1− δ) + ǫ
)
= 1.
We might thus consider an alternative to Expres-
sion (7):
E[f(Xi)|A(X1:i−1)] = E[f(Xi)] (8)
if P (A(X1:i−1)) > 0.
The concept of irrelevance conveyed by Expression (8)
does lead to Expression (6). To see this, note that for non-
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negative X and Y , we have
E[XY ] ≤ sup
P
EP
[
E[XY |Y ]
]
= sup
P
EP
[
AE[XY |Y ] +AcE[XY |Y ]
]
,
using disintegrability and defining A as the set of all values
of Y such that P (Ac) = 0. Hence P (Ac) = 0 for every P
and using Expression (8):
E[XY ] ≤ sup
P
EP
[
AY E[X |Y ]
]
= sup
P
EP
[
AY E[X ]
]
= sup
P
EP [AY ]E[X ]
= E[X ] sup
P
EP [Y ]
= E[X ]E[Y ] .
[As a digression, note that one might define condi-
tional expectations as E[X |A] = infP :P(A)>0EP [X |A]
and E[X |A] = supP :P(A)>0EP [X |A]. This form of con-
ditioning has been advocated by several authors [27, 28],
and it is quite similar to Walley’s concept of regular exten-
sion [26, Ap. J]. For such a form of conditioning, Expres-
sion (8) seems to be the natural definition of irrelevance.]
In short, more than one combination of definitions and
assumptions lead to the results presented in the remainder
of this paper. For instance, Expression (6) obtains when
Assumption (1) holds and disintegrability holds (because
all variables are simple, or because countable additivity is
assumed, or because disintegrability is imposed). Alterna-
tively, Expression (6) obtains when Expression (8) holds
for any i ∈ [2, n], any bounded function f of Xi, and any
event A(X1:i−1), and additionally disintegrability holds.
Similar remarks concerning zero probabilities can be
directed at Assumption (3). We say that weak irrelevance
obtains when either one of:
• For any i ∈ [2, n] and any nonempty event
A(X1:i−1),
E[Xi|A(X1:i−1)] = E[Xi]
and
E[Xi|A(X1:i−1)] = E[Xi]
[this is Assumption (3), and it requires full condi-
tional measures].
• For any i ∈ [2, n] and any event A(X1:i−1),
E[Xi|A(X1:i−1)] = E[Xi] if P (A(X1:i−1)) > 0
and
E[Xi|A(X1:i−1)] = E[Xi] if P (A(X1:i−1)) > 0.
3 Bounded variables
Take variablesX1, . . . , Xn such that supXi−inf Xi ≤ Bi
and define
γn
.
=
n∑
i=1
B2i > 0.
We start by deriving two concentration inequalities.
3.1 Concentration inequalities
The following inequality is a counterpart of Hoeffding in-
equality [8, 15] in the context of lower/upper expectations;
it is slightly tighter than similar inequalities by De Cooman
and Miranda [5]. It is interesting to note that the proof is
remarkably similar to the proof of the original Hoeffding
inequality.
Theorem 1 If bounded variables X1, . . . , Xn satisfy Ex-
pression (6), then if γn > 0,
P
(
n∑
i=1
(Xi − E[Xi]) ≥ ǫ
)
≤ e−2ǫ
2/γn ,
P
(
n∑
i=1
(Xi − E[Xi]) ≤ −ǫ
)
≤ e−2ǫ
2/γn .
Proof. By Markov inequality, if X ≥ 0, then for any ǫ > 0
we have P (X ≥ ǫ) ≤ E[X ] /ǫ. Consequently, for s > 0,
any variable X satisfies
P (X ≥ ǫ) = P
(
esX ≥ esǫ
)
≤ e−sǫE[exp(sX)] .
Using this inequality and Expression (6):
P
(
n∑
i=1
(Xi − E[Xi]) ≥ ǫ
)
≤ e−sǫE
[
exp
(
n∑
i=1
s(Xi − E[Xi])
)]
≤ e−sǫ
n∏
i=1
E
[
exp
(
s(Xi − E[Xi])
)]
.
We now use Hoeffding’s result (Expression (11)) that if
variable X satisfies a ≤ X ≤ b and E[X ] ≤ 0, then
E[exp(sX)] ≤ exp(s2(b− a)2/8) for any s > 0. Thus for
any P , EP
[
exp(s(Xi − E[Xi]))
]
≤ exp(s2B2i /8), and
then E
[
exp
(
s(Xi − E[Xi])
)]
≤ exp(s2B2i /8). Conse-
quently,
P
(
n∑
i=1
(Xi − E[Xi]) ≥ ǫ
)
≤ e−sǫes
2γn/8 ≤ e−2ǫ
2/γn ,
where the last inequality is obtained by taking s =
4ǫ/γn. This proves the first inequality in the
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theorem; the second inequality is proved by tak-
ing P
(∑n
i=1((−Xi)− E[−Xi]) ≥ ǫ
)
and noting that
E[Xi] = −E[−Xi]. ✷
We now move to weak irrelevance and obtain an ana-
logue of Azuma’s inequality [2, 7]. It is again interesting
to note that the proof is remarkably similar to the proof of
the original Azuma inequality. De Cooman and Miranda
[5, Sec. 4.1] show that their inequalities are valid under
weak irrelevance; the next inequality is slightly tighter than
theirs.
Theorem 2 If bounded variablesX1, . . . , Xn satisfy weak
irrelevance and disintegrability (Expression (4)) holds,
then if γn > 0,
P
(
n∑
i=1
(Xi − E[Xi]) ≥ ǫ
)
≤ e−2ǫ
2/γn ,
P
(
n∑
i=1
(Xi − E[Xi]) ≤ −ǫ
)
≤ e−2ǫ
2/γn .
Proof. Using both Markov’s inequality (as in the proof of
Theorem 1) and disintegrability, for any s > 0 we get
P
(
n∑
i=1
(Xi − E[Xi]) ≥ ǫ
)
≤ e−sǫE
[
exp
(
n∑
i=1
s(Xi − E[Xi])
)]
≤ e−sǫE
[
E
[
exp
(
n∑
i=1
s(Xi − E[Xi])
)
| X1:n−1
]]
≤ e−sǫE
[
exp
(
n−1∑
i=1
s(Xi − E[Xi])
)
h(X1:n−1)
]
,
where
h(X1:n−1) = E
[
exp
(
s(Xn − E[Xn])
)
| X1:n−1
]
.
Due to weak irrelevance,
EP [Xn|X1:n−1] ≤ E[Xn|X1:n−1] = E[Xn] ;
consequently, for any P ,
EP
[
Xn − E[Xn] |X1:n−1
]
≤ 0.
We now use Hoeffding’s result (Expression (11)) that if
variable X satisfies a ≤ X ≤ b and E[X ] ≤ 0, then
E[exp(sX)] ≤ exp(s2(b − a)2/8) for any s > 0. Thus
for any P we have
EP
[
exp
(
s(Xn − E[Xn])
)
|X1:n−1
]
≤ exp(s2B2n/8)
and then h(X1:n−1) ≤ exp(s2B2n/8). Thus
P
(
n∑
i=1
(Xi − E[Xi]) ≥ ǫ
)
≤ e−sǫE
[
exp
(
n∑
i=1
s(Xi − E[Xi])
)]
≤ e−sǫE
[
exp
(
n−1∑
i=1
s(Xi − E[Xi])
)
exp(s2B2n/8)
]
≤ e−sǫ exp(s2B2n/8)E
[
exp
(
n−1∑
i=1
s(Xi − E[Xi])
)]
.
These inequalities can be iterated to produce:
P
(
n∑
i=1
(Xi − E[Xi]) ≥ ǫ
)
≤ e−sǫ exp
(
s2
n∑
i=1
B2i /8
)
.
Finally, by taking s = 4ǫ/γn,
P
(
n∑
i=1
(Xi − E[Xi]) ≥ ǫ
)
≤ e−2ǫ
2/γn .
The second inequality in the theorem is proved by noting
that weak irrelevance of X1, . . . , Xn implies weak irrel-
evance of −X1, . . . ,−Xn (as E[Xi] = −E[−Xi]), and
then by taking P
(∑n
i=1((−Xi)− E[−Xi]) ≥ ǫ
)
. ✷
3.2 Laws of large numbers
Theorem 1 leads to simple proofs of laws of large numbers
already stated by De Cooman and Miranda [5]. To start,
take Assumption (1). Using subadditivity of upper proba-
bility and Theorem 1,
P
((
n∑
i=1
Xi ≥ nµn + ǫ
)
∪
(
n∑
i=1
Xi ≤ nµ− ǫ
))
≤2e−
2ǫ2
γn ,
where as before, µ
n
.
= (1/n)
∑n
i=1 E[Xi] and µn
.
=
(1/n)
∑n
i=1E[Xi]. By noting that P (A) = 1 − P (Ac)
for any event A, by including the endpoints of relevant in-
equalities, and by using nǫ instead of ǫ:
P
(
µ− ǫ ≤
∑n
i=1Xi
n
≤ µ+ ǫ
)
≥
P
(
µ− ǫ <
∑n
i=1Xi
n
< µ+ ǫ
)
≥ 1− 2e−
2nǫ2
B2 ,
where we defineB .= maxiBi. By taking limits, we obtain
a weak law of large numbers:
lim
n→∞
P
(
µ
n
− ǫ <
∑n
i=1Xi
n
< µn + ǫ
)
= 1.
An analogue of De Cooman and Miranda’s finitary strong
law of large numbers can be deduced as well from the pre-
vious inequalities, as follows. Here and in the remainder
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of the paper, n, N and N ′ denote positive integers. For all
ǫ > 0, N > 0 and N ′ > 0,
P
(
∃n ∈ [N,N +N ′] :
∑n
i=1Xi
n
≥ µ+ ǫ
)
≤
N+N ′∑
n=N
P
(∑n
i=1Xi
n
≥ µ+ ǫ
)
≤
N+N ′∑
n=N
e−2nǫ
2/B2
=
(
e−2Nǫ
2/B2
) N ′∑
n=0
e−2nǫ
2/B2
=
(
e−2Nǫ
2/B2
) 1− e2(N ′+1)ǫ2/B2
1− e−2ǫ2/B2
<
e−2Nǫ
2/B2
1− e−2ǫ2/B2
.
Consequently,
P
(
∃n ∈ [N,N +N ′] :
∑n
i=1Xi
n
≥ µ+ ǫ
)
< ǫ,
provided that N is a positive integer such that
N > −(B2/(2ǫ2)) ln ǫ(1− e−2ǫ
2/B2).
An analogous argument leads to
P
(
∃n ∈ [N,N +N ′] :
∑n
i=1Xi
n
≤ µ− ǫ
)
< ǫ.
By superadditivity of upper probability, we obtain a per-
haps more intuitive statement of the strong law of large
numbers: for all ǫ > 0, there is N such that for any N ′,
P
(
∀n∈ [N,N+N ′] :µ
n
−ǫ<
∑n
i=1Xi
n
<µn+ǫ
)
>1−2ǫ,
thus reproducing De Cooman and Miranda’s strong laws.
We now present a pair of weak/strong laws of large
numbers under weak irrelevance. De Cooman and Miranda
prove a similar pair of laws by resorting to their previous re-
sults on forward irrelevant natural extensions [5, Sec. 4.1].
The proof offered now is perhaps more direct, using our
analogue of Azuma’s inequality.
Theorem 3 If bounded variablesX1, . . . , Xn satisfy weak
irrelevance and Expression (4) holds, then for any ǫ > 0,
P
(
µ
n
− ǫ <
∑n
i=1Xi
n
< µn + ǫ
)
≥ 1− 2e−2nǫ
2/B2 ,
and there is N such that for any N ′,
P
(
∀n∈ [N,N+N ′] :µ
n
−ǫ<
∑n
i=1Xi
n
<µn+ǫ
)
>1− 2ǫ.
Proof. Using subadditivity of upper probability and Theo-
rem 2, and defining again B .= maxiBi,
P
((
n∑
i=1
Xi ≥ nµn + ǫ
)
∪
(
n∑
i=1
Xi ≤ nµ− ǫ
))
≤2e−
2nǫ2
B2 ,
and we obtain the first expression in the theorem. To pro-
duce the second inequality (strong law), note:
P
(
∃n ∈ [N,N +N ′] :
∑n
i=1Xi
n
≥ µ+ ǫ
)
≤
N+N ′∑
n=N
P
(∑n
i=1Xi
n
≥ µ+ ǫ
)
≤
N+N ′∑
n=N
e−2nǫ
2/B2
<
e−2Nǫ
2/B2
1− e−2ǫ2/B2
.
Again,
P
(
∃n ∈ [N,N +N ′] :
∑n
i=1Xi
n
≥ µ+ ǫ
)
< ǫ
provided that N is a positive integer such that
N > −(B2/(2ǫ2)) ln ǫ(1− e−2ǫ
2/B2).
This is “half” of the second expression in the theorem; the
other “half” is proved analogously. ✷
The theorem easily implies the following concise weak
law of large numbers, by taking limits:
lim
n→∞
P
(
µ
n
− ǫ <
∑n
i=1Xi
n
< µn + ǫ
)
= 1.
4 Laws of large numbers without
boundedness
We now consider variables without bounds in their ranges
under the assumption of weak irrelevance; the resulting
laws of large numbers are the main contribution of the pa-
per. We will assume in this section that countable addi-
tivity holds (Expression (5)). This assumption of count-
able addivity implies disintegrability; that is, EP [W ] =
EP [EP [W |Z]] for any P , W and Z . Thus our setup is
close to the standard (Kolmogorovian) one, where any ex-
pectation functional is a linear monotone and monotoni-
cally convergent functional that can be expressed through
Lebesgue integration. We only depart from the Kol-
mogorovian tradition in explicitly letting a set of such func-
tionals to be permissible given a set of assessments.
We will use a sequence of variables {Yn} defined as
follows:
Yn
.
=
n∑
i=1
Xi − EP [Xi|X1:i−1] .
6
The key observation is that Yn is a function of all variables
X1:n such that
EP [Yn|X1:n−1] =
(
n−1∑
i=1
Xi − EP [Xi|X1:i−1]
)
+
EP [Xn−EP [Xn|X1:n−1] |X1:n−1]
= Yn−1 +
EP [Xn|X1:n−1]− EP [Xn|X1:n−1]
= Yn−1;
so, {Yn} is a martingale with respect to P . Thus,
EP
[
(Yn − Yn−1)
2|X1:n−1
]
= EP
[
Y 2n |X1:n−1
]
− 2EP [Yn−1Yn|X1:n−1] + Y
2
n−1
= EP
[
Y 2n |X1:n−1
]
− 2Yn−1EP [Yn|X1:n−1] + Y
2
n−1
= EP
[
Y 2n |X1:n−1
]
− 2Yn−1Yn−1 + Y
2
n−1
= EP
[
Y 2n |X1:n−1
]
− Y 2n−1.
And by taking expectations on both sides and noting that
Yi − Yi−1 = Xi − EP [Xi|X1:i−1], we get
EP
[
Y 2n
]
= EP
[
(Xn − EP [Xn|X1:n−1])
2
]
+EP
[
Y 2n−1
]
.
Iterating this expression, we obtain:
EP
[
Y 2n
]
=
n∑
i=1
EP
[
(Xi − EP [Xi|X1:i−1])
2
]
. (9)
With these preliminaries, we have:
Theorem 4 Assume countable additivity. If variables
X1, . . . , Xn satisfy weak irrelevance, and E[Xi] and
E[Xi] are finite quantities such that E[Xi] − E[Xi] ≤ δ,
and the variance of any Xi is no larger than a finite quan-
tity σ2, then for any ǫ > 0,
P
(
µ
n
− ǫ <
∑n
i=1Xi
n
< µn + ǫ
)
≥ 1−
σ2 + δ2
ǫ2n
,
and there is N > 0 such that for any N ′ > 0,
P
(
∀n∈ [N,N+N ′] :µ
n
−ǫ<
∑n
i=1Xi
n
<µn+ǫ
)
>1− 2ǫ.
Consequently,
∀ǫ > 0 : lim
n→∞
P
(
µ
n
− ǫ <
∑n
i=1Xi
n
< µn + ǫ
)
= 1,
P
(
lim sup
n→∞
(∑n
i=1Xi
n
− µn
)
≤ 0
)
= 1,
P
(
lim inf
n→∞
(∑n
i=1Xi
n
− µ
n
)
≥ 0
)
= 1.
Proof. For a fixed P and for all ǫ > 0,
P
(
µ
n
− ǫ <
∑n
i=1Xi
n
< µn + ǫ
)
= P
(
n∑
i=1
E[Xi]− ǫn <
n∑
i=1
Xi <
n∑
i=1
E[Xi] + ǫn
)
≥ P
(
n∑
i=1
EP [Xi|X1:i−1]− ǫn <
n∑
i=1
Xi
<
n∑
i=1
EP [Xi|X1:i−1] + ǫn
)
(using weak irrelevance)
= P
(
−ǫ <
∑n
i=1Xi − EP [Xi|X1:i−1]
n
< ǫ
)
= P (−ǫ < Yn/n < ǫ)
= P (|Yn/n| < ǫ) .
Applying Chebyshev’s inequality and Expression (9),
P (|Yn/n| ≥ ǫ) ≤
EP
[
Y 2n
]
ǫ2n2
=
∑n
i=1EP
[
(Xi−EP [Xi|X1:i−1])2
]
ǫ2n2
.
Now write (Xi − EP [Xi|X1:i−1])2 as
((Xi − EP [Xi]) + (EP [Xi]− EP [Xi|X1:i−1]))
2
,
and then:
n∑
i=1
EP
[
(Xi − EP [Xi|X1:i−1])
2
]
=
n∑
i=1
EP
[
(Xi − EP [Xi])
2
]
+2EP [(Xi − EP [Xi])(EP [Xi]− EP [Xi|X1:i−1])]
+EP
[
(EP [Xi]− EP [Xi|X1:i−1])
2
]
≤
n∑
i=1
σ2 + δ2
+2(EP [Xi]− EP [Xi|X1:i−1])EP [Xi − EP [Xi]]
=
n∑
i=1
σ2 + δ2.
Hence
n∑
i=1
EP
[
(Xi − EP [Xi|X1:i−1])
2
]
≤ n(σ2 + δ2), (10)
and combining these inequalities, we obtain:
P (|Yn/n| ≥ ǫ) ≤
σ2 + δ2
ǫ2n
,
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and then
P
(
µ
n
− ǫ <
∑n
i=1Xi
n
< µn + ǫ
)
≥ 1−
σ2 + δ2
ǫ2n
for any P , as desired. By taking the limit as n grows with-
out bound, we obtain
lim
n→∞
P
(
µ
n
− ǫ <
∑n
i=1Xi
n
< µn + ǫ
)
= 1.
The proof of the strong law of large numbers uses the
same strategy, but replaces the appeal to Chebyshev’s in-
equality by an appeal to the Kolmogorov-Hajek-Renyi in-
equality (described in the Appendix), following the proof
of the strong law of large numbers by Whittle [29, Thm.
14.2.3].So, for a fixed P and for all ǫ > 0, we proceed as
previously to obtain:
P
(
∀n∈ [N,N+N ′] : µ
n
−ǫ<
∑n
i=1Xi
n
<µn+ǫ
)
≥ P
(
∀n∈ [N,N+N ′] : −ǫ <
Yn
n
< ǫ
)
= P (∀n∈ [N,N+N ′] : |Yn/n| < ǫ) .
As {YN , YN+1, . . . , YN+N ′} forms a martingale, we use
the Kolmogorov-Hajek-Renyi inequality to produce:
P (∀n∈ [N,N+N ′] : |Yn/n| < ǫ)
≥ 1−
∑N
i=1EP
[
(Xi − EP [Xi|X1:i−1])2
]
ǫ2N2
−
N+N ′∑
i=N+1
EP
[
(Xi − EP [Xi|X1:i−1])2
]
ǫ2i2
≥ 1−
σ2 + δ2
ǫ2N
−
N+N ′∑
i=N+1
σ2 + δ2
ǫ2i2
(using Expression (10))
≥ 1−
σ2 + δ2
ǫ2N
−
∞∑
i=N+1
σ2 + δ2
ǫ2i2
≥ 1−
σ2 + δ2
ǫ2
(
1
N
+
∫
∞
N
1/i2di
)
= 1−
σ2 + δ2
ǫ2
(
1
N
+
1
N
)
= 1− 2
σ2 + δ2
ǫ2N
.
Consequently, for integer N > (σ2+δ2)/ǫ3, we obtain the
desired inequality
P
(
∀n∈ [N,N+N ′] :µ
n
−ǫ<
∑n
i=1Xi
n
<µn+ǫ
)
>1−2ǫ.
The proof of the Kolmogorov-Hajek-Renyi can be ex-
tended to an infinite intersection of (decreasing) events ex-
pressed as {∀j ≥ 1 : |Xj| < ǫj}; thus
∀ǫ > 0 : ∀δ > 0 : ∃N > 0 :
P
(
∀m ≥ N :
∑m
i=1Xi − E[Xi]
m
< ǫ
)
≥ 1− δ,
and this is equivalent to:
∀ǫ > 0 : lim
N→∞
P
(
∀m≥N :
∑m
i=1Xi − E[Xi]
m
< ǫ
)
= 1.
As the events in these probability values form an increasing
sequence, we have, for all ǫ > 0,
P
(
∃N > 0 : ∀m ≥ N :
∑m
i=1Xi − E[Xi]
m
< ǫ
)
= 1.
Now this is equivalent to ∀k > 0 : P (Ak) = 1, where
Ak = {∃N > 0 : ∀m ≥ N : (1/m)
∑m
i=1Xi − E[Xi] >
1/k}, and because P (∪k>0¬Ak) ≤
∑
k>0 P (¬Ak) = 0,
we have P (∀k > 0 : Ak) = 1, so
P
(
∀k>0: ∃N>0: ∀m≥N :
∑m
i=1Xi − E[Xi]
m
< ǫ
)
= 1.
This is exactly the desired expression
P
(
lim sup
n→∞
(∑n
i=1Xi
n
− µn
)
≤ 0
)
= 1.
A similar argument proves the last inequality in the theo-
rem, starting from:
∀ǫ > 0 : ∀δ > 0 : ∃N > 0 :
P
(
∀m ≥ N :
∑m
i=1Xi − E[Xi]
m
> −ǫ
)
≥ 1− δ.
✷
5 Discussion
The concentration inequalities and laws of large numbers
proved in this paper assume rather weak conditions of epis-
temic irrelevance. When compared to usual laws of large
numbers, both premises and consequences are weaker: ex-
pectations are not assumed precisely known, and conver-
gence is interval-valued.
Theorems 1 and 2 and their ensuing laws of large num-
bers are implied by De Cooman and Miranda’s seminal
work [5] (and their results generalize several previous ef-
forts [12]). Actually, De Cooman and Miranda start from
a weaker condition of forward factorization that is implied
both by Assumption (1) and weak irrelevance. The possi-
ble advantage of our proof techniques for these two theo-
rems is that they are rather close to well-known methods in
standard probability theory, such as Hoeffding’s inequality
(it should be noted that De Cooman and Miranda already
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indicate the similarity between their inequalities and Ho-
effding’s).
The most significant results of the paper employ weak
irrelevance to produce concentration inequalities (Theorem
2) and laws of large numbers (Theorems 3 and 4). The lat-
ter theorem is possibly the most valuable contribution. The
strategy for most proofs is to translate assumptions of weak
irrelevance into facts regarding martingales, and to adapt
results for martingales to this setting. This strategy keeps
the proof relatively short and close to well-known results
in probability theory. The connection between lower/upper
expectations and the theory of martingales seems rather
natural [4, 25], but the relationship between epistemic ir-
relevance and martingales does not appear to have been ex-
plored in depth so far. We note that the basic constraint
defining martingales (that is, E[Yn|X1:n−1] = Yn−1) is
preserved by convex combination of mixtures; therefore,
the study of martingales seems appropriate when one deals
with convex sets of probability measures — certainly it
seems less contorted than the analysis through stochastic
independence, as stochastic independence is not preserved
by convex combination.
The proofs presented in this paper need assumptions
of disintegrability that can be easily satisfied if countable
additivity is adopted. It is an open question whether similar
results can be proven without disintegrability, particularly
when one deals with unbounded variables.
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A Two auxiliary inequalities
The following inequality is a simple extension of a basic
result by Hoeffding [8, 15]: If variable X satisfies a ≤
X ≤ b and E[X ] ≤ 0, then for any s > 0,
E[exp(sX)] ≤ exp(s2(b − a)2/8). (11)
First, the inequality is clearly valid if a = b, or if a = 0, or
if b < 0. From now on, suppose b ≥ 0 > a. By convexity
of the exponential function,
exp(sx) ≤
x− a
b− a
esb +
b− x
b− a
esa for x ∈ [a, b].
Given monotonicity of expectations and E[X ] ≤ 0,
E[exp(sX)] ≤
b
b− a
esa −
a
b− a
esb
.
= exp(φ(s(b − a)))
for φ(u) = −pu+ log(1− p+ peu) with p = −a/(b− a)
(and note that p ∈ (0, 1] in the situation under considera-
tion). Given that φ(0) = φ′(0) = 0 and φ′′(u) ≤ 1/4 for
u > 0 (as the maximum of φ′′(u) is 1/4, attained at eu =
(1 − p)/p), we can use Taylor’s theorem as follows. For
some v ∈ (0, u), φ(u) = φ(0) + uφ′(0) + (u2/2)φ′′(v) ≤
(u2/8) and consequently φ(s(b − a)) ≤ s2(b− a)2/8. By
putting together these inequalities, we obtain Expression
(11).
We now review the Kolmogorov-Hajek-Renyi inequal-
ity, almost exactly as proved by Whittle [29]; this is pre-
sented just to indicate the role of (elementwise) disinte-
grability in the derivation. Let {Xi} be a martingale with
X0 = 0, and let {ǫi} be a sequence 0 = ǫ0 ≤ ǫ1 ≤ . . . ; the
inequality is
P (∀j ∈ [1, n] : |Xj | < ǫj) ≥ 1−
n∑
i=1
E
[
(Xi −Xi−1)2
]
ǫ2i
.
To prove this inequality, defineAn
.
= {∀j ∈ [1, n] : |Xj | <
ǫj}. Using ξi = Xi − Xi−1, and again denoting an event
and its indicator function by the same symbol, we have
P (An) = EP [An] = EP [An−1{|Xn| < ǫn}]
≥ EP
[
An−1(1−X
2
n/ǫ
2
n)
]
(as {|X | < ǫ} ≥ 1−X2/ǫ2)
= EP
[
An−1(1− (X
2
n−1 + ξ
2
n)/ǫ
2
n)
]
(by the martingale property)
≥ EP
[
An−2(1−X
2
n−1/ǫ
2
n−1)
]
− EP
[
ξ2n/ǫ
2
n
]
(as ǫn−1 ≤ ǫn and
{|X | < ǫ}(1−X2/ǫ2) ≥ (1 −X2/ǫ2)).
Iteration of the last inequality yields the result. Note that it
was necessary to apply disintegrability of P when applying
the martingale property (that is, elementwise disintegrabil-
ity is used).
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